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Abstract
The ‘Pay-as-per-use’ model of cloud computing requires a user to rent cloud resources or services for a period of time and make payment 
accordingly. This paper proposes a demand-based preferential resource allocation technique that designs a market-driven auction mechanism 
to identify users for resource allocation based on their payment capacities and implements a payment strategy based on a buyer’s service 
preferences. A comparison is drawn between the proposed allocation technique and the famous off-line VCG auction mechanism and results 
show a performance benefit in revenues to service provider, payments of cloud users besides ensuring an optimum resources use.   
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1. Introduction
Efficient resource allocation is a major concern in utility-based systems such as cloud computing. Cloud users approach a cloud 
service provider to execute their tasks which require cloud resources in various measures. In return, users pay for the resources 
utilized by them. Resources, such as, memory, processing units, network bandwidth, are embodied in virtual machines (VMs). 
Resources and VMs are used interchangeably in this paper. In order to service multiple users simultaneously with varied 
resource requirements, a cloud provider needs to implement an efficient resource allocation technique which reflects the 
demand-supply scenario of the market along with being beneficial to both the service provider and the service user. Offline and 
online auctions are considered one of the best ways of resource allocation where a user is selected based on his/her payment 
capacity and resource requirements [11]. In cloud computing, auction is a method of selling cloud resources in a public forum 
through competitive bidding. In general, a cloud auction requires cloud users to bid for their required resources. Bid prices 
usually reflect the resource needs and paying capacity of a user. Cloud service provider will select user(s) based on their bids 
and allocate resources to them in such a manner that profit to service provider is ensured as well as Quality of Service 
parameters to auction winners is also maintained. These selected users will be termed as ‘winners’ in the present work
A resource auction in cloud datacenters can be ‘open’ or ‘closed’ [7]. Once winners are determined, service provider allocates 
resources and charges the winners for the same based on their bidding price, task duration, preferences, etc. 
__________________________
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This paper presents a resource allocation technique which is divided into two steps, a market-driven auction process which 
ensures truthfulness and profit to the service provider and a preference- driven payment process which ensure that the winner 
pays lesser amount than his bid value provided that his bidding reflects his best paying capacity.
Further, performance of this proposed resource allocation technique is compared with the well known off-line VCG mechanism 
[20] and obtained results verify that the presented technique is better than VCG in terms of efficient resource allocation, fairness
to user and improved revenue to a cloud service provider.
2. Related Work
The ‘pay-as-you-use’ model of computing attracts many users due to its various benefits like cost-efficiency, low maintenance, 
improved flexibility, etc. However, it also highlights an important issue of effective resource management which must ensure a 
truthful, fair and profit-reaping allocation of resources to users. A dynamic resource allocation scheme is proposed in [1] which 
introduces a non pre-emptive pricing and allocation scheme for batch jobs with the aim of maintaining social welfare. A 
performance comparison between offline VCG mechanism and a proposed truthful auction mechanism is shown in [2] which 
guarantee profit to a service provider. A three tier admission control and scheduling mechanism is presented in [3] which 
involves cloud users, a SaaS provider and a public IaaS to minimize a provider’s expenditure and improve a user’s experience in 
utilizing cloud resources. QoS based resource provisioning mechanism is given in [4] based on the Dirichlet multinomial model 
claiming to reduce cost of computing resources. Other allocation technique based on QoS is given in [5] which considers 
allocation as an optimization problem and uses a combination of batch matching and reverse auction to deal with it. 
Combinatorial auctions are proposed in [6] which guarantee cost efficiency and truthfulness by using price vector space. 
Another variation of resource auction in cloud computing is presented in [7] using Continuous Double Auction mechanism for 
order matching and trading.. SLA-based resource management and allocation strategy is studied in [12] presenting its elements 
and various challenges. Reservation-based and ad-hoc pricing of resources is discussed in [8] and a deterministic equivalent 
formulation is designed using sample-average approximation and Bender’s decomposition for the same. Resource allocation 
strategies given in [9, 17] use periodic auction of computing resources to match with the dynamic user requirements. 
A detailed survey on various QoS parameters in cloud computing is done in [10] outlining their strengths and limitations. 
Amazon’s Spot-market auction mechanism is studied in [11] and a dynamic resource allocation algorithm is developed to 
increase a service provider’s revenue. A threshold-driven learning based algorithm is presented in [13] which admit users based 
on a service provider’s overload threshold. Resource management problem is considered in [14, 15] where the main revenue 
maximization is considered as the main objective. Additionally, negotiations of resource leasing contracts between a service 
provider and users are explored in [15] to improve their proposed allocation strategy. Benders decomposition and sample-
average approximation methods are implemented in [16] to solve reservation-based resource allocation problems. Further, in 
[18] a multi-time period optimization model is designed to reduce expenditures of a service provider by turning off servers over 
a time period and adjusting their work-loads. A truthful and dynamic online resource auction is presented in [19] which avoids 
false bidding behaviors of users and reflects the supply-demand curve of various resource types. The much celebrated offline 
VCG auction mechanism along with its variants is explained in [20]. Most of the work related to resource distribution in cloud 
computing favors an online truthful auction mechanism with the aim of either maximizing service provider’s revenue or 
minimizing their operational cost. The resource allocation technique proposed in the present work ensures fair payment strategy 
to selected users and revenue maximization to cloud service provider, along with reflecting the demands of every resource type. 
Further, comparison of the presented technique with offline VCG auction mechanism shows a considerable increase in 
provider’s revenue and decrease in a user’s payment amount.  
3. System Model 
The proposed resource allocation technique is divided into two phases- an open market-driven auction process followed by 
preference-driven payment process. Main entities involved in the resource allocation process are a single cloud service provider 
and N cloud users. Cloud service provider maintains multiple heterogeneous resources such as memory, processing units, 
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network bandwidth, etc. in the form of virtual machines (VMs). When these VMs are requested by users to accomplish their 
tasks, cloud provider allocates them depending on user’s payment capacity and preferences. In return the user pays for these 
VMs as per the quantity and duration used. 
Keeping in mind the varieties of users’ tasks such as input-output intensive, processor-intensive or memory-intensive, our 
proposed resource allocation model considers three types of VMs (denoted by K), namely, communication-driven, processing-
driven and storage-driven VMs. Hence, the value of K (VM type) is taken to be 3 as K1 (communication-driven VMs), K2 
(processing-driven VMs) and K3 (storage-driven VMs). Total expenditure incurred by a cloud provider for resource allocation 
includes VM initiation cost (ICVMtype), task processing cost (TPC), data transfer cost (DTC) and data storage cost (DSC). Cloud 
provider adds these costs as additional cost (AC). On the other hand, a Cloud user maintains his unique id and declares his task 
arrival time (AT) along with bid-prices of VM instances at the commencement of auction process. Bid prices are indicated by 
BPVMtype. Table 1, given below, summarizes the symbols used in the paper along with their meanings.   
Table 1: Summary of symbols used and their meanings
The proposed resource allocation system model is shown in figure 1. There are N users, denoted as n1, n2, n3 , …. and nN. A 
single cloud provider manages three types of VMs as K1, K1 and K3. Service provider maintains updated information about the 
availability and demands of these VMs. It helps the provider in determining the starting price (SPVMtype) of each VM type at the 
start of auction. 
The Resource Allocation Unit (RAU) is divided into two sub-units as-
1. Auction Sub-unit
2. Payment Sub-unit
The purpose of auction sub-unit is to determine winners among bidders and payment sub-unit charges winners according to their 
preferences and bid prices. Detailed functioning of these two sub-units is explained in the next section. 
Figure 1: Resource Allocation System Model
Symbol Meaning Symbol Meaning
N Number of Cloud Users denoted as n1, n2 ….nN SPK1 Starting Price of K1 VM instance
K Types of VMs considered as K1, K2, K3 SPK2 Starting Price of K2 VM instance
BPK1 User’s Best-Bid price for K1 VM instance SPK3 Starting Price of K3 VM instance
BPK2 User’s Best-Bid price for K2 VM instance RK1 Number of K1 instances required by a user
BPK3 User’s Best-Bid price for K3 VM instance RK2 Number of K2 instances required by a user
RAU Resource Allocation Unit RK3 Number of K3 instances required by a user
ICK1 Initiation Cost of K1 VM instance DSC Data Storage Cost
ICK2 Initiation Cost of K2 VM instance DTC Data Transfer Cost
ICK3 Initiation Cost of K3 VM instance AC cloud service provider’s Additional Cost
TPC Task Processing Cost TBP Total Bid Price of a user
AT Task Arrival Time BPP Bid-Price Payment
T Duration of one allocation round
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4. Proposed Resource Allocation Technique
The proposed resource allocation technique is a periodic process where a cloud service provider auctions cloud resources (VMs) 
to users and charges them for the quantity of resources used. The duration of a single round of allocation is set as T and each 
round consists of three steps. The current allocation round is denoted as i. Step 1 describes a pre-auction process followed by a 
market-driven open auction in step 2 and finally in step 3 a user’s payment mechanism is explained. Detailed description of each 
step in a single round of the proposed allocation technique is given below.  
4.1 Pre-auction- An ith round of the resource allocation technique starts at time t=0 when a cloud service provider 
establishes the starting price of each type of VM instance, i.e. SPK1, SPK2, SPK3 using equation 1. Starting price is also 
considered as reserve price for a resource type in the present work. 
   
1
 
iVMtypeiVMtype
MeanBPSP … (1)
where (SPVMtype)i = SPK1/ SPK2/ SPK3 in the ith round of allocation process and 
(Mean BPVMtype)i-1 = MeanBPK1/MeanBPK2/MeanBPK3 in the (i-1)th round of allocation.
Equation 1 states that the starting price of a VM type instance in the current allocation round will be based on the 
average bid price of the same VM type instance in the previous allocation round. For example, suppose the mean bid-
price for an instance of VM type K3 in the last allocation round was P, then at the commence of next auction round, 
starting price of  K3 type VM instance is set as P. A resource’s bid-price reflects its current demand. Hence, this
strategy of setting the last mean bid price as the next starting price of a resource instance follows the market supply-
demand scenario and justifies a resource’s utility. Therefore, the allocation presented in this paper is a ‘market-driven’ 
technique. Besides establishing the starting price, a cloud service provider also calculates the additional cost incurred 
by him during the resource allocation process as-
VMtypeICTPCDTCDSCAC         … (2)
4.2 Market-driven Open Auction- The 2nd step of resource allocation technique is an auction process which is divided 
into two halves. At t=0, the service provider declares the starting prices of resources (calculated in step 4.1) to the 
public and invites bid-prices from interested users for each required VM type, such that 
VMtypeVMtype SPBP t
Bid Price offered by a user indicates his highest payment capacity for a resource type and it will increase his chances of 
winning the auction. Hence, we also term it as a user’s ‘best-bid’. Also if a user wins the auction process, then his 
actual payment will be less than his best bid payment (calculated in the following step 4.3). Interested users or bidders 
submit their task’s VM requirements along with their best bid for each VM type as per the format given below in figure 
2. Here, TBP is the calculated sum of BPK1, BPK2 and BPK3.
Figure 2: User’s bid format
At time t = T/2, i.e. midway in the allocation round, service provider calculates the mean total bid of all the bidders for 
the duration 0 to T/2, using equation 3 and mean bid price of each VM type using equation 4.
x
TBP
MeanTBP
x
i
i¦
  1                             ... (3)
 
x
BP
MeanBP
x
i
iVMtype¦
  1                                  … (4)
where x is the total number of bidders from time t=0 to t=T/2. Bidders whose total bid price (TBP) is equal to or higher 
than the mean total bid price (MeanTBP), are considered winners for allocation from t=0 to t=T/2. As an example to 
illustrate the first half of an auction process, consider 3 bidders with their bid formats as given in figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Example for winner determination
As shown in figure 3, cloud users n1, n2 and n3 state their individual VM requirements, individual bid prices for each 
VM type instance and total bid price [for format refer figure 2]. MeanTBP for x as 3 is calculated using eqn 3 as
3
3
1
¦
  i
iTBP
TBPMean 343
343633
 

 
Also, 3 as
1KMeanBP 11
3
111210   
Similarly,
2KMeanBP 133
101415   
and
3KMeanBP 10
3
13108   
Users n2 and n3 are selected as winners for first half of the auction as their offered TBP >= MeanTBP. 
Unselected users (like n1 in example) are asked to revise their bid prices such that revised BPVMtype >= MeanBPVMtype
as calculated in eqn 4 and rebid for the second half of the auction round i.e. from t=T/2 to t=T. As per the example in 
figure 3, user n1 is allowed to rebid for the second half of the current auction round i, with an increased bid price of 
each VM type. Finally, at time t=T, service provider repeats the winner determination procedure by calculating 
MeanTBP of all users who have submitted their bids between t=T/2 to t=T. These users include fresh bidders and also 
unselected bidders of the first half of auction round i. MeanTBP calculation is done as given in eqn 3 for t=T/2 to t=T. 
Bidders whose TBP is equal or higher than the meanTBP are declared winners. These two winner-lists (first half and 
second half) are merged and arranged in non-increasing order of their TBPs. The purpose of dividing auction in two 
halves to declare two winner-lists is to give another chance to unselected users to rebid with an increased bid price. 
This will not only increase the profitability of the service provider but will also be fair to users. Hence, this auction 
strategy is termed as ‘open’ auction [7]. Note that the MeanBPVMtype calculated using eqn 4 in the second half of auction 
will be set as SPVMtype in the next (i+1)th round of resource allocation technique as stated in step 4.1. 
4.3 Preference-driven Payment- Merged list of winners, arranged in decreasing order of TBPs, is forwarded to step 4.3
where payments are made by these winners. Winner’s actual payment is calculated based on his chosen preference 
which the service provider offers as shown in table 2.
Table 2: Preferences Table
Task Deadline Option Service Time Option VMs Possession Option
D1: Fixed S1: Immediate P1: Full-time
D2: Flexible S2: Flexible P2: Partial
Every winner is given a flexibility to choose their task’s deadline, service time and possession options. For example, if 
a winner’s task deadline is flexible, but he needs immediate allocation of VMs and will hold all allocated VMs till his 
task is over, he will choose preference D2S1P1. A winner’s preference will decide his actual payment (AP) criteria as 
outlined Table 3. Calculation of actual payment based on preference is also given in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Payment Table
Preferences Actual Payment Criteria Actual Payment (AP) Calculation by a winner i
D1S1P1 BP of the paying winner (i) + AC iAP      > @ ACBPKRKBPKRKBPKRK iii  3*32*21*1
D1S1P2 BP of the paying winner (i) iAP      > @iii BPKRKBPKRKBPKRK 3*32*21*1  
D2S1P1 BP of the next winner (p) in the list iAP      > @pipipi BPKRKBPKRKBPKRK 3*32*21*1  
D2S1P2 BP of 2nd next winner (q) in the list iAP      > @qiqiqi BPKRKBPKRKBPKRK 3*32*21*1  
D2S2P1 BP of last winner (r) in the list iAP      > @ririri BPKRKBPKRKBPKRK 3*32*21*1  
D2S2P1 MeanBP of each VM types iAP      > @321 *3*2*1 KiKiKi MeanBPRKMeanBPRKMeanBPRK  
Actual payment made by a winner i is compared against his bid-price payment (BPP) which is calculated using 
equation 5. 
     > @iiii BPKRKBPKRKBPKRKBPP 3*32*21*1         … (5)
Further, utility of resource allocation for a winner is given by equation 6, as-
iii APBPPUtility                    … (6)
For example, consider a winner-list as shown below in figure 4. Offering the highest TBP among winners, user n2 gets 
the first chance to figure out his preferences. Suppose, n2 chooses preference D2S1P1 (i.e. flexible deadline but 
immediate VM allocation and full time possession of VMs), then n2 will make actual payment according to the bid 
prices offered by next user in the winner-list i.e. n3. 
Winners’ Ids TBP
n2 36
n3 34
n11 25
n8 14
                                                                             Figure 4: Example of winners list
User n3’s bid prices are shown in figure 3 as BPK1 is 11, BPK2 is 10 and BPK3 is 13 and n2’s VM requirements are 
RK1 is 3, RK2 is 6 and RK3 is 2, then using table 3, we get-
2nAP =      13*210*611*3  = 119
If we calculate n2’s best-bid price payment by considering his own bid-prices for K1, K2 and K2 type VMs which are 
12, 14 and 10 respectively, then using eqn 3 we get-
2nBPP =      10*214*612*3  = 140
As is evident from the calculations shown above, a cloud user will always pay less than what he best-bids for resources. 
However, in case of preference D1S1P2 actual payment is equal to a winner’s best-bid payment. Also if a winner opts 
for preference D1S1P1, his actual payment will exceed his best-bid payment as in this case winner has chosen the 
highest priority preference.
5. Results and Discussion
The proposed resource allocation technique is experimented on CloudSim environment consisting 3 heterogeneous 
resources with multiple instances, a single service/resource provider and multiple users. In a single allocation round, four 
110   Narander Kumar and Swati Saxena /  Procedia Computer Science  57 ( 2015 )  104 – 111 
winners were identified and their max and min actual payments as shown in figure 5. Figure 6 shows the variation of 
revenues earned by the service provider.
Figure 7 compares the minmum actual payment of a winner with his best-price payment. As shown in the figure, the proposed 
technique allows a winner to pay an amount which is considerably less than his bid price. This payment strategy works in favor 
of cloud users provided that they quote their ‘best’ bid price to win the auction. Figure 8 shows the variation in utilities earned 
by winners according to the actual payment they make based on their preferences. 
Our proposed allocation startegy is comapred with VCG auction mechanism and the results obtained are shown in figures 8 and 
9. Figure 8 shows that the payment made by a winner in VCG is less as compared to that in the present work, which is beneficial 
to a service provider, however, at the same time, cloud users benefit by making a payment far less than their quoted price as
shown in figure 7. Revenues earned by a service provider, in cases of VCG and the proposed work, are compared in figure 9 
which clearly shows that the present auction technique out-performs the classical VCG auction technique. 
6. Conclusion
In the present work, a demand-driven preferential resource allocation technique is introduced involving a truthful auction 
process followed by a fair payment mechanism. This proposed technique involves bid revisions, re-biddings and multiple
payment criteria for a cloud user whereas a service provider draws maximum advantage by following the current demands 
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of resources and setting their prices accordingly. A comparative study between the proposed technique and the well 
researched VCG mechanism is also presented which highlights the performance benefits of the present work.
Future work will extend the proposed allocation mechanism by including an energy efficient scheduling strategy to allot 
auction winners’ tasks to suitable VMs such that minimum number of VMs is required to be activated at any time.       
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